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I. Introduction
Until its amendment in March 2005, the Korean Civil Code (“the Code”)
employed the hoju (meaning “Master of the Family”) system, which conferred
privileges upon each family’s respective hoju, including certain enumerated
powers over members of his family. The last pronoun, i.e. his, is used deliberately;
the hoju system and its rules, including those which identify that title-bearer in
each family, were based upon the domestic supremacy of the male. In February
2005, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea declared the hoju system
incompatible with the Constitution.1) Accordingly, in March 2005, the National
Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed a bill reforming the Code which,
among others, abolished the hoju system. It also lifted the ban on marriage
between couples bearing the same surnames and permitted mothers to pass on
their surnames to their children.2) These events represent the culmination of the
latest stage of development towards gender equality in Korean family law.
The process leading to the above developments represented the struggle
between tradition and the Korean Constitution.3) The main thrust of the movement
to reform Korean family law was the desire to conform that law to the
Constitution. The main argument against such reforms was that the hoju system, as
a deeply rooted element of Korean culture, ought to be left intact. One of the
dissenting opinions in the above decision of the Constitutional Court held that
guarding Korean tradition was a constitutional prerogative, and that institutions
such as the hoju system that were deeply rooted in tradition were, by the
Constitution’s own provisions, not unconstitutional. Other places where Korea’s
traditions crop up in its family law include the previous ban on marriage between a
man and woman with a common surname (sŏng) and ancestral seat (pon’gwan)
(hereafter, common surname marriage ban)4) and the practice of children inheriting
their surnames from their fathers only.
In this paper I will discuss whether special consideration should be given
to the fact that certain rules are supported by tradition in determining their
1) The Korean Constitutional Court decision of February 3, 2005 (case no. 2001heonga9 et al.). 
2) The Law amending the Civil Code, promulgated on March 31, 2005.
3) Hereafter, the Constitution means the Korean Constitution.
4) See, the Constitutional Court’s decision on July 16, 1997 (case no, 95 heonga 6 et al).
Tradition and the Constitution in the Context of the Korean Family Law
195
Tradition and the Constitution in the Context of
the Korean Family Law
Jinsu Yune*
* Professor, Seoul National University College of Law. E-mail: jsyune@snu.ac.kr. This paper was
originally presented at the 12th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, held in July
2005 at Salt Lake City, USA.
194
Abstract
Reform of Korean family law was marked by struggles between the constitutional principles and
tradition. The movement to conform family law to the Constitution was retarded by the resistance of
conservative groups, whose main argument was that family law ought to be rooted in tradition. But
tradition alone cannot be a defense for an otherwise unconstitutional law. In the reform process, the
Korean Constitutional Court played a significant role in upholding the primacy of the Constitution, as
evident in the decisions regarding the common surname marriage ban and the hoju system. 
daughter marries her surname does not change and she retains her father’s
surname, etc. 
B. The Influence of Japanese Colonization on Korean Family Law
Korea became a Japanese colony in 1910. The official position of Japan
regarding Korean family law was that family law matters should be governed
according to Korean customs and not by the Japanese law. The actual practice was
to the contrary; the Japanese government and courts imposed Japanese family laws
upon the Koreans on the pretense that the same rules existed in Korean custom.6)
One important example is the above-mentioned hoju system, originally a part of
the Japanese Civil Code of 1898. Under hoju, all individuals are organized into
families (in Japanese, Ie) - not actual households but abstract, ideal entities
composed of relatives, whether living together or not. The heads of these families,
the hoju, have certain powers over other members of the family. Hoju status itself
and its inheritance are reserved for males in principle.
Such an abstract, ideal entity as the hoju and family in the sense of the
Japanese Ie never previously existed in Korean law or custom. Yet the Japanese
government and courts persisted in asserting that such a system was in fact a
Korean tradition and nevertheless imposed it upon the Koreans, substituting the
inheritance of ritual ancestor worship with the inheritance of hoju.  
III.  The Korean Civil Code of 1958
Korea was liberated from Japan in 1945 and the new Korean Civil Code was
promulgated thirteen years later. For the drafters of the Code, Part 4 of the Code
codifying family law was the subject of a heated debate, whose central theme was
the relationship between the Constitution and tradition. The Korean Constitution
guaranteed equal protection under the law, prohibited gender discrimination, and
declared that marriage and family life had to be established and maintained on
the basis of the dignity of the individual and gender equality. Three theories
6) See, Hyunah Yang, Envisioning Feminist Jurisprudence in Korean Family Law at the Crossroads of
Tradition/Modernity, Ph. D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1998.
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constitutionality. The first part of the paper will explain the historical background
of Korean family law, followed by an exposition of the major characteristics of
family law in the original Code, and the changes made thereto by the later
enactments. Subsequently, the decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court on this
point will be analyzed in some detail, followed by a discussion of relevant theory.
My conclusion is that tradition in and of itself does not bestow constitutionality on
an otherwise unconstitutional law.
II.  The Historical Background of Korean Family Law
A. The Influence of Confucianism on Korean Family Law
The Chosŏn Dynasty was established in 1392, replacing the Koryŏ. The
founders of the Chosŏn adopted Confucianism5) as their dynastic ideology,
rejecting Koryŏ Buddhism. The Confucian principle directly governing family
relations is Chongppŏp (agnatic principle), whose main features are that: (1) all
descendants of one common male ancestor belong to one family, no matter how
distant their mutual degree of consanguinity is; and (2) the family lineage is
succeeded by the eldest son of the male ancestor and his primary wife. The eldest
son (Chŏkchangja) is also the master of the Chesa (ancestor worship ritual), and
thus his inheritance extends further than mere property. One corollary of
Chongppŏp is that marriage between a man and a woman with a common surname
(sŏng) and ancestral seat (pon’gwan) is prohibited as incestuous because the two
belong to the same “family.” This ban could be interpreted as an extended form of
the Western prohibition of endogamy. These new family-related rules, originally
imposed by the government, were gradually accepted by the people and became
pervasive social norms from the 17th century on. 
In sum, the family law of the Chosŏn was based upon patrilineal and
patriarchal principles, e.g. a child’s surname should be that of her father, if a
5) Strictly speaking, what Chosŏn had adopted is the so-called Neo-Confucianism formed in China during the
era of Southern Sung (1127-1279). The most notable representative of the Neo-Confucianism is Chu Hsi (1130-
1200).
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The hoju system was never, until forcefully imposed, part of Korean tradition but
its reinforcement of the extant patrilineal and patriarchal systems was accepted
without reservation by the Korean populace.  
IV. The Transition of Family Law after the Enactment of 
the Civil Code
The Civil Code was enacted on January 1, 1960. From the time of its
enactment, the Code’s family and inheritance laws were heavily criticized because
of their incompatibility with the Constitution, especially with regard to their
unequal treatment of women. The major reforms of the family and inheritance
laws in 1977 and 1990 were the fruits of this criticism.
However, the common surname marriage ban and the hoju system survived the
reforms. The National Assembly did not pass any bills abolishing these provisions,
due to the political campaigning of the conservative groups, especially proponents
of Confucianism. These groups’ principal argument against reform was the
“custom deference theory”: family law should defer to tradition. 
Nevertheless, these two institutions were not exempt from change. First, the
common surname marriage ban was temporarily lifted by special acts three times
in 1978, 1988, and 1996. These exemptions lasted only about a year each, but they
indicated a changing social atmosphere. 
Second, the privileges of the hoju were gradually weakening. Originally, the
hoju had the authority to consent to entrance into and departure from the family, to
order departure from the family, to designate the family’s place of residence, etc.
Since the 1977 and 1990 reforms, however, the powers of the hoju were
diminished significantly. The ones that remained were the power to request
incompetence declarations of family members from courts (Civil Code, Art. 9,
12), to consent to the departure of a family member from the family in the case of
his/her mother’s marriage (Civil Code, Art. 784 sec. 2), to order the entrance of a
lineal ascendant or descendant of the hoju into the hoju’s family (Civil Code, Art.
785), to request the court to summon the family council (Civil Code, Art. 966),
etc. 
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were advanced about what the relationship between the Constitution and
tradition/custom ought to be.7)
The first theory was the “custom deference theory.” The main proponent of this
position was Chief Justice Byung-Ro Kim, the chairman of the Codification
Committee. Kim asserted that the Korean culture was highly advanced and that the
patrilineal system rooted therein was reasonable. He went on to say that Korean
family law should be based on the patrilineal system and that gender equality had
no room in family matters.
The second theory was the “Constitution deference theory.” The main
proponent of this position was Professor Kwang-hyun Chung of Seoul National
University, who argued that the new family laws should be based upon the spirit of
the Constitution and that traditional family law rules incompatible with the
Constitution should be abolished.
Kyung-Keun Chang, chairman of the judiciary committee of the National
Assembly and the chief architect of the draft of the new family and inheritance
laws, advanced a third, intermediate position. Chang asserted that gradual reform
was appropriate, reasoning that laws become ineffective if they depart too far from
social realities and traditions, but that laws should lead society nonetheless.
Gradual reform was, according to Chang, the best way to achieve the ultimately
desired goal.
The actual issue was whether the common surname marriage ban should be
sustained, the most debated theme in the drafting stage of the Civil Code.8) The
original bill included a provision containing the ban, which was deleted by the
judiciary committee. Finally, the National Assembly decided to adopt the ban and
revived the government’s bill.
Another point of dispute was the “master of the family” system, which was
provided for in the final version of the Code. Ironically, those who imposed the
system in the first place, the Japanese, abolished the system in 1947 under the
pressure of the Allied Occupation Army. 
The first battle over the common surname marriage ban was won by tradition.
7) For an overview, see, Hyunah Yang (Fn. 7), pp. 118 ff.; Jinsu Yune, Der Einfluss der Verfassung auf die
Reform des Familienrechts (in German), Seoul Law Journal Vol. 45 No. 1, pp. 437 ff.
8) For materials, see Chung, Kwang-hyun, Han’kuk kajokppŏp Yonku (Studies on Korean Family Law),
Appendix, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1967.
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fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 1010) or Article 36 (1) of the
Constitution, but differed completely on other points.
The majority opinion emphasized the individual’s freedom of marriage, which
is the right of every citizen to marry or not to marry freely, and to choose his or her
marriage partner and time of his or her marriage. This right is best expressed by
the majority opinion’s assertion that the “majority of the public’s concept of
marriage has changed from one of ‘a union between families’ to one of ‘a union
between persons,’ reflecting the respect for a person’s free will.”
On the other hand, the first dissenting opinion emphasized that marriage should
be publicly recognized through social norms such as customs, morals, and
religion, and dismissed individual freedom as relatively unimportant. In this
context, the dissenting opinion stressed the duty of the state to preserve and further
develop traditional culture prescribed in Article 9 of the Constitution.
The majority opinion stated that the common surname marriage ban originated
in tribal times, when patriarchy, based on the caste system and the idea of male
dominance, was the organizing principle. As is prescribed in Article 10 of the
Constitution, our society has become more liberal and democratic, putting the
principles of “freedom” and “equality” forth as essential, and has done away with
the old caste system and the idea of male dominance underlying the common
surname marriage ban. The majority opinion also stated that conceptions of
marriage and the family have changed, although the first dissenting opinion
claimed that even if there were fundamental changes in the social environment and
people’s way of thinking, such changes did not necessitate the conclusion that the
Korean people’s general consciousness had changed as well. 
The majority opinion and the first dissenting opinion both acknowledged the
fact that the special laws concerning marriage were enacted on three separate
occasions after enactment of the Code. According to the majority, the fact that
44,827 married couples were given legal relief through the special laws was strong
evidence that the common surname marriage ban was inappropriate. In contrast,
the first dissent argued that the special laws did not support the argument against
the rationality of Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code, but merely accomplished the
singular aim of granting specific relief to the parties concerned.
10) Art. 10 of the Korean Constitution: “Every citizen has human dignity, self-worth, and the right to pursue
happiness. The state confirms the inviolable fundamental human rights and has the duty to protect those rights.”
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V.  The Constitutional Court’s Decisions on the Common
Surname Marriage Ban and the Hoju System
Two decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court have dealt with the
relationship between tradition and the Constitution in the context of family law.
One was the July 16, 1997 decision on the common surname marriage ban (case
no, 95 heonga 6 et al). The other was the February 3, 2005 decision on the hoju
system (case no. 2001heonga9 et al.).
A. The July 16, 1997 Decision on the Common Surname Marriage Ban9)
As previously mentioned, the common surname marriage ban was one of the
main features of Confucianism-based Korean family law. The ban was codified as
Article 809 (1) of the Korean Civil Code, and was the most controversial issue at
the time the present Civil Code was first legislated in 1957. 
Even after the Code’s enactment, family law scholars and feminist groups
made repeated petitions to abolish the provision. As a consequence, proposals for
amendments were submitted to the National Assembly on several occasions.
These efforts failed due to strong opposition, especially from staunch proponents
of Confucianism. However, as a compromise, as previously mentioned, the
common surname marriage ban was temporarily lifted by special acts three times. 
In the Constitutional Court’s decision, five Justices declared that the provision
was “decidedly unconstitutional,” while two Justices contended that the statute
was “incompatible with the Constitution.” The remaining two Justices maintained
that Civil Code Article 809 (1) was constitutional. However, the Constitutional
Court ruled the statute “incompatible with the Constitution” rather than “decidedly
unconstitutional” because of the lack of a quorum of six Justices, which is required
for a declaration of unconstitutionality under Constitution Article 113 (1). 
The majority opinion and the first dissenting opinion both agreed that the
freedom of marriage and the freedom to choose a marriage partner were
9) See, Jinsu Yune, Recent Decisions of the Korean Constitutional Court on Family Law, Journal of Korean
Law, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2001, pp. 145 ff.; Mi-Kyung Cho, Violation of the Constitution in Korean Family Law, in:
Andrew Bainham (ed.), The International Survey of Family Law 2002 Edition, Jordan Publishing, 2002, pp. 244 ff.
for more about this decision.
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which required that every person be afforded “human dignity and self-worth and
the right to pursue happiness” and also the right to “enter into and sustain a
marriage and family life on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the
sexes.” According to the majority opinion, there was no rational basis for
justifying such a restriction, which depended solely upon the male lineage.  In the
majority opinion’s view, Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code amounted to gender-
based discrimination in contravention of the constitutional principle of equality of
the sexes.
The second dissent also declared that the clause at issue in Article 809 (1) of
the Civil Code was unconstitutional, but did not express any definite grounds for
its determination. Rather, the opinion only claimed that the clause should not have
been declared “decidedly unconstitutional.” The opinion set forth its reasoning
thus: certain prohibitions against marriages have been handed down for hundreds
of years and, as a result, such prohibitions have not only become part of the
marriage custom but also have become ethical norms; family law, especially the
institution of marriage, is a discretionary matter best left for the legislature, which
should take into consideration factors such as tradition, custom, ethical
consciousness, concept of blood relations, and eugenics.
The second dissent continued, saying that even if Article 809 (1) of the Civil
Code were found unconstitutional, the National Assembly should carefully
consider whether the common surname marriage ban had altogether lost its social
appropriateness and whether such prohibition could in any way be reformed to
better reflect our Constitution.  Further, the opinion raised the question of whether
the current prohibition of marriage between relatives and the revocation of such
marriages needed to be revised in line with the current state of national tradition
and concepts pertaining to family relations. Through this examination, the second
dissent raised the possibility of establishing a new marriage system with the
threshold requirement that Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code be declared
“incompatible with the Constitution.”
In sum, the majority based its ruling on the Constitution while the backbone of
the first dissent was a recourse to tradition. The second dissent took the middle
position, the compromise between the majority and the first dissent, and between
the Constitution and tradition. 
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These differences of opinion resulted in the use of different criteria in
examining the constitutionality of Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code. The first
dissent asserted that the constitutionality of this provision should be examined on
the premise that, while taking into consideration such factors as the origin of the
law, the degree of customary acceptance, appropriateness in making the law
customary and changes to present circumstances, the ban was a law peculiar to the
regulation of marriage that should not be examined by strict reason. Therefore, the
extent to which customs pertaining to family relationships could be regulated by
law was within the realm of legislative discretion. Hence, in the first dissent’s
view, unless the judgment of the legislature was clearly irrational, the legislature’s
discretion should not be ruled unconstitutional. 
The first dissent applied a rational basis standard with minimal judicial
scrutiny. In its view, the objective of the common surname marriage ban was to
enforce traditional marriage customs and to maintain and preserve the existing
social order. The first dissent argued that this objective was proper, and the
balancing of interests by the legislature in its enactment of Article 809 (1) of the
Civil Code did therefore not pose any problems. Thus, the first dissent did not
view the objective as violative of the minimal scrutiny principle that the least
restrictive means be used to further a governmental interest. Further, the first
dissent rejected the contention that women’s rights were infringed, stating that
because Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code merely codified the traditional custom
relating to family law, it could not be argued that the clause discriminated based on
gender. Also, the traditional patrilineal familial/kinship system could not be
reasonably changed within a span of days.
To counter the above arguments, the majority stated that a new perspective and
value system based upon the spirit of the Constitution and its relevant provisions
should determine whether there existed any valid reasons for maintaining the
common surname marriage ban. Although the majority took a position closer to a
strict scrutiny standard, this is not obvious from the opinion. According to the
majority, because Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code restricted a person’s right to
marry a person with a common surname (a criterion determined according to the
patrilineal system), such a restriction amounted to gender-based discrimination.
The majority then stated that Article 809 (1) of the Civil Code lacked both
rationality and appropriateness in the current social context and at the same time
collided directly with the spirit of the Constitution and its relevant provisions,
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Rather, family law should actively disseminate the spirit of the Constitution which
alone embodies the highest values of the community. If a law becomes an
impediment to the dissemination of the Constitution’s spirit, such a law should be
modified. 
Regarding the relation between Article 9 of the Constitution, which emphasizes
the importance of tradition, and Article 36 (1) of the Constitution, which provides
that marriage and family life must be established and maintained on the basis of
the dignity of the individual and gender equality, the majority reasoned that Article
36 (1) best answered the issue at hand, and expressed the constitutional decision
that the patriarchal marriage system of the past should not be tolerated in the
future. On the other hand, tradition in the Constitution should be understood,
according to the majority, as a historical and time-bound concept, meaning that
tradition should be reinterpreted in the context of the Constitution according to
contemporary sensibilities. In this process, the spirit and values contained in the
Constitution should be among the primary benchmarks. Thus, in the realm of the
family, tradition and traditional culture should not be contrary to the dignity of the
individual and gender equality. As a result, if a certain tradition contravenes the
dignity of the individual and gender equality, it cannot be justified on the ground
of Article 9. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the majority opinion ruled that all three
provisions comprising the hoju system were unconstitutional because they resulted
in unjustifiable gender discrimination and violated the dignity of the individual.
But the majority opinion chose to classify the relationship as “incompatible” rather
than “decidedly unconstitutional” because the declaration of “decided
unconstitutionality” could create a vacuum in the family register system.  In
contrast, a decision of “incompatibility” would allow the temporary application of
the hoju system for as long as needed to reform the family register system. 
There were three dissenting opinions. The dissenting opinion by Justice Seong
Kwon and Justice Young-Il Kim regarded the hoju system as constitutional. This
opinion held that the meaning of the hoju system lay in the fact that the
construction of the family and the succession of the hoju were based upon
patrilineal principles and that the hoju had a symbolic status as the successor of the
family. Against the criticism that the hoju system was not a traditional institution
but one implanted by Japan, the opinion stated that after the family law reform of
1990, the hoju system was totally removed from Japanese influences. According
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B. The February 3, 2005 (case no. 2001heonga9 et al.) 
decision on the hoju system
The issue in this case was whether the three provisions of the Korean Civil
Code which comprised the hoju system were constitutional. Article 778 of the
Code defines hoju, providing that a person who has succeeded to the family
lineage, or set up a branch family, or who has established a new family or has
restored a family for other reasons, shall become the master of the family or hoju.
Article 781 (1), first sentence, provided that a child shall have its name entered in
its father’s family register; Article 826 (3) does the same for a man’s wife.
The key issue in this case was once again, the relationship between tradition
and the Constitution. The majority and dissenting opinions dealt with this problem
in detail. 
The majority opinion of six justices held these three provisions unconstitutional
and incompatible with the Constitution. The opinion understood the tenets of
family composition and the succession of the hoju as the core elements of the hoju
system. Every citizen belongs to a family as a hoju or a member. This family is an
ideal entity, different from an actual household. What is important to note is that
the composition of this ideal “family” is predetermined; the identity of the hoju
and the identities of everyone else are set by law rather than by the “family’s” will.
Under this system, the hoju is considered the heart of the family while members
are considered peripheral. The succession order of the hoju is: ① the male
descendent of the former hoju, ② the female descendent of the hoju who was a
member of the family, ③ the wife of the former hoju, ④ the female ascendant of
the former hoju who was the member of the family, ⑤ the wife of a member of the
family who was also the member of the family. The basic principle organizing the
succession of the hoju is patrilinealism, i.e., favoring males.
The majority opinion discussed the relationship between family law and
tradition. First, it stressed the point that the Constitution was the highest law of the
state and that the institution of the family and its corresponding laws were under
the Constitution’s rule. Although the family is a product of history and society, it is
not immune from the Constitution’s precepts. Otherwise, the legislative power in
the field of family law would not be bound by the Constitution, a paradox for a
self-proclaimed constitutional democracy. The opinion opined that family law
should not be a mere reflection of social realities or legal sentiments of the people.
Finally, the dissenting opinion of Justice Hyo-Jong Kim regarded the first
sentence of Article 781 (1) and Article 826 (3) as unconstitutional but Article 778
as constitutional. According to his opinion, the hoju system in itself could not be
considered a means to achieve patrilinealism. He held that the family provisions of
the Code could be understood as a manifestation of the family in private law that
is guaranteed by the Constitution. That the law requires an individual to belong to
a family compulsorily could not be said to violate one’s dignity because family
relations, an individual’s social roots, may be reflected in legal concepts and the
law can order an individual to belong to a family granted constitutional protection.
Additionally, Article 778 lost much of its force because it provided that a person
should belong to a family but did not provide for any legal consequences in cases
of its violation. This made the provision, and its limit on freedom, more symbolic
than real and thus less objectionable. Justice Hyo-Jong Kim held the hoju itself to
be a traditional concept. There was in fact tension between Articles 36 (1) and 9 of
the Constitution in that the balance of power between the hoju and other members
of the family was not equal. In this respect, Kim held that the recognition of the
hoju in itself lay within the legislative discretion because the hoju system
enhanced the efficiency of the family register system and was supported by
tradition. 
But Justice Hyo-Jong Kim held the other provisions comprising the system
unconstitutional as incompatible with Article 36 (1) of the Constitution, especially
with respect to gender equality. In this sense, he concurred with the majority
opinion. 
VI.  Discussion
Should the fact that such legal rules as family laws are rooted in tradition be
given special consideration in deciding their constitutionality? This question is the
basic concern of this paper. There are some opinions in the literature supporting
this position. 
Professor Young Huh asserts that marriage and family life are traditional and
customary in origin and existence and not constitutional phenomena, thus the
Constitution must respect the traditional meaning and existence of marriage and
family life by making room for them in the realm of the Constitution. As a result,
Tradition and the Constitution in the Context of the Korean Family Law
207
to this opinion, the then current system embodied traditional, rational patrilineal
principles.
Concerning the relationship between tradition and the guarantee of marriage
and family life according to Article 36 (1) of the Constitution, this opinion held
that the guarantee of marriage and family life was based on the tradition of the
national culture, because family law should have traditional, conservative and
ethical characteristics, and that the interpretation of a constitutional provision
regarding marriage and the family life should take into account the traditional
character of the family law. This understanding was supported by Article 9, which
provided that the State should endeavor to inherit and develop the traditional
culture and to promote the national culture, and thus, there ought to have been a
way to fulfill the requirement of gender equality and maintain respect for tradition
at the same time. 
In the process of deciding whether the hoju system was compatible with gender
equality by applying the “least intrusive test”, this dissent regarded the
preservation of the patrilineal principle as a legitimate purpose. This opinion held
that although the system had many shortcomings, it strengthened the mutual
relationships within the family and contributed to the preservation and integration
of the family by enhancing the father’s sense of responsibility to his children. In
addition, the adverse effects of the hoju system for women were not so great as to
negate the positive effects of the system, that is, the preservation and integration of
the family and kinship ties, and preventing the vices of materialist thought and
individualism. 
But Justice Seong Kwon and Young-Il Kim each advanced a contrary result.
Justice Seong Kwon regarded all three provisions as constitutional, while Justice
Young-Il Kim regarded the first sentence of Article 781 (1), which provided that a
child shall have its name entered in its father’s family register, as unconstitutional.
Justice Kim opined that the hoju system itself could not be unconstitutional, and
that the principle that a child should have its name entered in its father’s family
register was in itself constitutional but that there should be room for more
exceptions, i.e. to allow a child to have its name entered in its mother’s family
register, the mother being the person who actually rears the child, married or
single. In this sense, the first sentence of Article 781 (1) should be declared
unconstitutional because it does not allow exceptions in such cases, possibly
contrary to a child’s wishes and discriminating against the mother. 
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rule should be preserved because it is supported by tradition, the desire to preserve
the rule and tradition themselves becomes the purpose for the rule’s existence, and
not the well-being of mankind. This is a case of the tail wagging the dog. 
Tradition in the sense of Article 9 can be meaningful if, for example, the state
seeks to protect a traditional building to preserve traditional architecture. In such a
case, the protection of the traditional culture can be a just cause in restricting
property rights. But the preservation of traditional laws cannot be a just reason for
restricting human rights. In other words, we must distinguish between two types of
rules, namely, the rule whose purpose is to protect tradition or traditional culture,
and the rule that is supported by tradition, but whose purpose is not the protection
of the tradition. In the former case, the protection of culture can be a just and
legitimate reason that should be accorded weight in deciding the constitutionality
of the rule, but in the latter case, that the rule is supported by tradition cannot cure
its otherwise unconstitutionality.
The solution supported by some scholars, i.e., a traditional rule is constitutional
if supported by a majority of the people, cannot be sustained because the ratio
legis of judicial review lies in the protection of minorities. If a rule supported by
the majority of the people is executed without any restraint, minorities are left
vulnerable, especially by rules under which the losses of minorities far exceed the
gains of the majority. Judicial review was established to prevent such results and
protect minorities by permitting independent court(s) to overrule decisions of the
legislature representing unbridled majority will.14)
The reasoning of the dissenting opinions of the hoju system decision of the
Korean Constitutional Court that the hoju system should be sustained under the
protection of Article 9 of the Constitution was thus misrouted from the start. On
the other hand, the majority opinion of that decision is not completely satisfactory
on this point: it implicitly assumes that in some cases Article 9 can be grounds for
affirming the constitutionality of tradition-supported laws. Whether a rule is
supported by tradition is immaterial in the context of Article 9 of the Constitution.
Then is tradition meaningless in the context of judicial review? The answer to
this question is that in some circumstances the fact that a legal rule is supported by
14) See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, New York,
Gaithersburg, Aspen Law & Business, 2nd ed., 2002, p. 7. 
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he regards the hoju system as not unconstitutional because it can exist separately
as a decision of the legislature in order to effectuate the patrilineal principle.11) The
dissenting opinion of Justices Seong Kwon and Young-Il Kim in the
Constitutional Court’s hoju system decision seemed to be influenced by this
opinion as it stressed that the interpretation of constitutional provisions regarding
marriage and family life should take into account the traditional character of
family law.
But this assertion cannot be accepted in its entirety. As the majority opinion of
the Constitutional Court’s hoju system decision emphasized, although the family is
a historical and social product formed and developed with the history of the
nation, it is not immune from the rule of the Constitution. Otherwise, legislation in
the field of family law would not be constitutionally bound, an intolerable result in
a constitutional democracy.  
Other scholars emphasize the tradition mentioned in Article 9 of the
Constitution. One of these scholars asserts that respect for tradition is a duty
imposed on the state by Article 9, so the Constitutional Court should take tradition
into account in deciding the constitutionality of a legal rule supported by tradition.
In deciding whether such a tradition is to be preserved or abolished, the Court
should seek the opinions of scholars and experts.12) Another scholar asserts in the
same vein that, if a traditional rule is supported by a majority of the people, this
rule amounts to “customary law” in the terminology of anthropologist Leopold
Pospisil and falls into the category protected by Article 9, whereas, if a traditional
rule is not supported by a majority of the people, it becomes authoritarian law and
does not deserve Constitutional protection.13)
In my own opinion, that something is part of tradition cannot be grounds for
justifying traditional legal rules from a constitutional perspective. Law exists for
mankind, not vice versa. Law also cannot be a purpose in and of itself. If a certain
11) Young Huh, Hunbubkwa Gajeokbub (Constitution and the Family Law), in: Yonsei University
Bubryulyeongu Vol. 3, 1983, pp. 419 ff. But it seems that he has changed his position afterwards. See, Young Huh,
Hangukhunbubron (Treatise on the Korean Constitution), 4th ed., Seoul, Pakyoungsa, 2004, p. 164. 
12) Dai-Kwon Choi, Hunbubeui Yeonsokseonggua Byeonhwae Guanhan Damron (Continuity and Change in
Constitution), Seoul National University Law Journal, Vol. 44 No. 1, 2003, pp. 97 ff. 
13) Ji-Bong Lim, Hunbubjaepangwa Sahoibyeondong (Constitutional Adjudication and Social Change),
Gosigye, 2001, No. 12. pp. 4 ff. 
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necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on
what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in
this area, for judgment and restraint.”
Quoting Justice Harlan, the majority opinion of Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), written by Justice
Powell, stated that “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”16)
But the invocation of tradition is a two-edged knife. At times, tradition has
been invoked to deny substantive due process rights that were found to be thereby
unsupported. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105
L.Ed.2d 91, 57 USLW 4691 (1989), the opinion of the court, delivered by Justice
Scalia, denied that the power of a biological father to assert parental rights over a
child born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man was a protected
substantive due process right because such a power was not sufficiently rooted in
the traditions and conscience of the American people as to qualify as fundamental.
Then should the issue of whether certain activities, not protected by the
Constitution explicitly, are supported by tradition or not, be conclusive in deciding
whether people have a fundamental right to such activities? The answer should be
never. Traditional support for a certain activity can be grounds for acknowledging
such an activity as constitutionally protected by right, but the lack of support of a
specific tradition does not mean that it should not be protected by the Constitution.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003),
the majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, held that the Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual acts was unconstitutional, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
16) Footnotes omitted.
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tradition should be considered relevant. If some provisions of the Constitution
were based upon certain traditions, these traditions must be considered in the
interpretation of such provisions. For example, there is a general consensus that
property guaranteed by the Article 23 (1) of the Constitution means property in the
traditional sense. 
Then, does marriage and family life protected by Article 36 (1) mean
traditional marriage and family life, that is, the patriarchal and the patrilineal form
of marriage and family life? The dissenting opinions of the hoju system decision
answered this question in the affirmative. But, as the majority opinion of that
decision explained, Article 36 (1) should be understood as the expression of the
constitutional decision that the patriarchal and patrilineal marriage and family
lifestyle of the past should not be tolerated, for it provides that marriage and
family life must be established and maintained based upon the dignity of the
individual and gender equality, which was not the case in the traditional
patriarchal family. 
This debate in Korean law can be compared with the debate on substantive due
process precedents in the U. S. Supreme Court. It is well known that the Supreme
Court precedents protect privacy and family-related liberties as constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental rights under substantive due process.15) But the
Constitution itself provides only for procedural due process, not substantive due
process_so the legitimacy of these precedents is fiercely debated. 
One influential approach to finding and articulating substantive due process
rights is to define these rights by way of tradition. The dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989
(1961) asserted that the right to use contraceptives was a constitutionally protected
substantive due process right. Harlan opined that “Due process has not been
reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.
The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of
organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of
15) See, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833
(1992), protecting the right of abortion.
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Abstract
This paper focuses on the role and delegated authority of the Korea Securities and Exchange
Commission (KSEC) regarding securities regulation and enforcement during the period up to the 1997
Asian financial crisis period. Securities regulation, at this time in Korea, was generally administered
under the combined auspices of several government agencies. These agencies included the KSEC, the
Securities Supervisory Board (SSB), Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), Korean Securities
Depository (KSD) and the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE). The Korean SEC, specifically, acted under
the conferred authority of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA), enacted in 1962.  
Since Korea’s recent democratic emergence in 1945, the government has incorporated facets of
American, Japanese, and German law into its own legal system. For this reason, it is of interest to
investigate the KSEC, acting under the provisions set forth in the SEA, with some comparison to its
American counterpart, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To accomplish this, a
compilation of primary government sources, related articles, and scholarly texts will be used.  
To date, very little work exists regarding the KSEC and its role in the Korean securities market and
economy during the pre-1997 period. Because of this omission within the current academic literature,
the current topic has been undertaken.
106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), although sodomy was not supported by
tradition. On this point, the majority opinion opined that “[H]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.”17)
VII.  Conclusion
Reform of Korean family law was marked by struggles between the
Constitutional principles and tradition. The movement to conform family law to
the Constitution was retarded by the resistance of conservative groups, whose
main argument was that family law ought to be rooted in tradition. But tradition
alone cannot be a defense for an otherwise unconstitutional law. In the reform
process, the Korean Constitutional Court played a significant role in upholding the
primacy of the Constitution, as evident in the decisions regarding the common
surname marriage ban and the hoju system. 
17) 123 S.Ct. 2480.
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